

SRI GUIDELINE

(delivered to most major institutional investors and parties interested in proxy matters)

Meeting Information	
Company	CHEVRON CORPORATION
Ticker	CVX
CUSIP	166764100
Meeting Type	Annual
Meeting Date	05/26/21
Record Date	03/29/21

Items & Recommendations

We recommend that clients holding shares of CHEVRON CORPORATION vote:

Item	Egan-Jones Recommendation	Management Recommendation
1A-1L – Election of Directors	FOR, WITH EXCEPTION OF 1D), ENRIQUE HERNANDEZ JR, 1F) JON M. HUNTSMAN JR 1J) RONALD D. SUGAR, 1K) JAMES D. UMPLEBY III, 1L) MICHAEL K. WIRTH	FOR ALL
2 – Ratify PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as the Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm	AGAINST	FOR
3 – Approve, on an Advisory Basis, Named Executive Officer Compensation	AGAINST	FOR
4 – Shareholder Proposal to Reduce Scope 3 Emissions	FOR	AGAINST
5 – Shareholder Proposal Regarding Report on Impacts Of Net Zero 2050 Scenario	FOR	AGAINST
6 – Shareholder Proposal Regarding Shift to Public Benefit Corporation	FOR	AGAINST
7 – Shareholder Proposal Regarding Report on Lobbying	FOR	AGAINST
8 – Shareholder Proposal Regarding Independent Chair	FOR	AGAINST
9 – Shareholder Proposal Regarding Special Meetings	AGAINST	AGAINST

Considerations and Recommendations

Egan-Jones' review centered on the Proposals in the context of maximizing shareholder value, based on publicly available information.

Governance Rating Score Summary

The Egan-Jones Governance Rating is based upon data sourced from FactSet Research Systems Inc., the company's public filings, reputable news sites, as well as other regulatory disclosures such as those found at the SEC and FASB

Ticker
Company name

CVX
CHEVRON CORPORATION ...

Board Rating

Item
CEO and Chairman Separate
Annual Director Elections
All Classes of Stock Have Equal Voting Rights
Compensation Committee with All Independents

TRUE/FALSE
FALSE
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE

Audit Committee with All Independents	TRUE
Nominating Committee with All Independents	FALSE
Non-binding Compensation Vote on Agenda	TRUE
Two Thirds Majority Independent Directors on Board	TRUE
Over-boarded CEO Director	FALSE
Over-boarded Board Chair	FALSE
Over-boarded Non-CEO Director	FALSE
Major cyber security breach	FALSE
Failure to implement sufficient carbon risk plan	FALSE
Other financial or operational risk control failure	FALSE
Other serious reputational risk failure by the Board	FALSE
Version	VER 2.10 12/15/2017
Sub Total	60.00
Performance Adjustment	0.00
Total	60.00
Final Board Score	Neutral

Compensation Rating

CEO Total Comp(\$)	29,016,686
CEO Salary (\$)	1,635,417
TSR (%)	-25.93
Market Capitalization (\$M)	162,581.97
Wealth Creation (\$M)	-42154.95
Wealth Creation/CEOPAY	0.00
Raw Score (pre adjustments)	Needs Attention
Final Score	Needs Attention
Rating Model Version	VER 3.10 1/22/2021
High CEO Total Compensation	Negative Adjustment
CEO Salary Under \$1 Million Limit	No Adjustment
Other Adjustments:	No Adjustment

Audit Rating

Audit Fees	28,300,000
Total Fees	30,100,000
Non-Audit Fees exceed 50%	FALSE
Auditor has served for seven or more years	TRUE
Raw Score	Some Concerns
Version	VER 1.11 1/22/2021
Final Score	Needs Attention

Governance Rating

Overall Score	Needs Attention
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Cyber Security Risk Rating

The Egan-Jones Cyber Risk Ratings helps stake holders assess the security posture (health) of covered entities. EJPS analysts use the SecuritiesScorecard platform to ascertain the company's Score which is incorporated into the EJPS Proxy Research Report. The methodology utilized for determining the Score can be found at http://ejproxy.com/media/documents/Egan-Jones_Proxy_Services_Cyber_Risk_Rating.pdf. For additional questions or comments please contact research@ejproxy.com or +1-844-495-5244 x1102.

Company Name

CHEVRON CORPORATION

Domain

chevron.com

SSC Letter Grade

B

SSC Industry

energy

Application Security

D

Cubit Score

A

DNS Health

D

Endpoint Security

B

Hacker Chatter

A

IP Reputation

A

Network Security

B

Information Leak

A

Patching Cadence

A

Social Engineering

A

Minimum Factor Grade

D

EJP Qualitative Adjustment

None

Final Score

Some Concerns

Cyber Security Scoring Engine Version

2.0.1 - EJP

Items 1A-1L

Election of Directors

Director Name	Nominee	Key Committee Membership	Attendance (<75%)	Position CEO/Chair	Director Since	Diverse director	Classification	Footnotes	EJP recommendation
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
CHARLES W W. MOORMAN IV	Yes	A	No		2012		Independent Outside Director		FOR
ENRIQUE HERNANDEZ JR	Yes	C	No		2008	Yes	Independent Outside Director	F18	WITHHOLD
ALICE P. GAST	Yes	N	No		2012	Yes	Independent Outside Director		FOR
JON M. HUNTSMAN JR	Yes	C	No		2020		Independent Outside Director	F18	WITHHOLD
RONALD D. SUGAR	Yes	C,N	No		2005		Affiliated Outside Director	F6, F18	WITHHOLD
MICHAEL K. WIRTH	Yes		No	CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER	2017		Inside Director	FSR11	WITHHOLD
DAMBISA F. MOYO	Yes	A	No		2016	Yes	Independent Outside Director		FOR
WANDA M. AUSTIN	Yes	N	No		2016	Yes	Independent Outside Director		FOR
JOHN B. FRANK	Yes	A	No		2017		Independent Outside Director		FOR
JAMES D. UMPLEBY III	Yes	C,N	No		2018		Independent Outside Director	F18	WITHHOLD
DEBRA REED KLAGES	Yes	A	No		2018	Yes	Independent Outside Director		FOR
MARILLYN A. HEWSON	Yes	A	No		2020	Yes	Independent Outside Director		FOR

F6 Affiliation - Over-tenured director - Member of a Key Board committee

According to Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines a director whose tenure on the Board is 10 years or more is considered affiliated, except for diverse nominees. We believe that key Board committees namely Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees should be comprised solely of Independent outside directors for sound corporate governance practice.

F18 Member of the Compensation Committee and the Company earns a compensation score of Some Concerns or Needs Attention

Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines state that the Compensation Committee should be held accountable for such a poor rating and should ensure that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are centered on a competitive pay-for-performance culture, strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders and necessary to attract and retain experienced, highly qualified executives critical to the Company's long-term success and the enhancement of shareholder value.

FSRI1 Combined CEO and Board Chair Positions

According to Egan-Jones' SRI Proxy Guidelines, there is an inherent potential conflict in having the CEO or former CEO serve as the Chairman of the Board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability.

Item 2

Ratify PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as the Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

Recommendation:

At Egan-Jones Proxy Services we review relevant factors, both qualitative and quantitative in nature, before issuing a recommendation regarding the ratification of appointment of independent auditors. We believe that auditor rotation every seven years, a ratio of non-audit fees and total fees not exceeding 50%, a lack of significant and material disciplinary actions taken against the Company's Auditor and any financial interest of the auditor in or association with the Company are the minimum criteria that should be taken into consideration in ensuring the auditor's independence.

The sum total of our evaluation can be found in the Auditor Rating we give this auditor. Generally and absent other negative factors, we suggest a score of **Neutral** or higher. This audit firm has earned a grade of **Needs Attention** and thus, has failed to pass our model.

After, taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders should not support the ratification of the auditors. **Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal.**

**See scoring details on top of the report.*

Background:

While ratification of auditors is one of the most common proposals submitted to shareholders it should not be overlooked. After employing the most qualified directors and CEO, to manage and grow the company, having equally experienced auditors should be next in importance. Reliable auditors are critical to ensuring shareholders receive accurate and timely reports of the Company's financial performance.

Exhibit 1 - Audit Fees

	Current Fiscal Year		Prior Fiscal Year
Audit Fees	\$ 28,300,000	\$	28,200,000
Audit Related Fees	\$ 100,000	\$	1,100,000
Non Audit and Tax Fees	\$ 1,700,000	\$	900,000
Total Fees	\$ 30,100,000	\$	30,200,000

Exhibit 2 - Audit Fee Ratios

	Relevant Ratios	Note
Total Fee Increase/Decrease	-0.3%	
Non-Audit Related Fees divided by Total Fees (Current FY):	5.6%	Should not be higher than 50%

Board Auditor Choice: **PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP**

PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP is a PCAOB (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board) registered auditor. Public records show that there have been a disciplinary actions taken against this firm; however, we do not believe this to be unusual for such a large company with a big number of employees, in most of these cases.

Nevertheless, we note the PCAOB Release No. 105-2017-032 from August 2, 2017 in which the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board censured PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP ("PwC" or "Respondent") and imposed on PwC a civil money penalty in the amount of \$1,000,000. The Board imposed these sanctions on the basis of its findings that PwC violated PCAOB rules and standards in connection with its 2014 audit and examination engagements for Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated ("Merrill"), a broker-dealer registered with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission").

In addition, we note the 2014 PCAOB order (PCAOB Release No. 105-2014-007) in which the Board censured Randall A. Stone, CPA ("Stone"), Randall A. Stone, age 51, of Austin, Texas, a certified public accountant licensed under the laws of Texas (license no. 047916), imposed a civil money penalty in the amount of \$50,000; and barred Stone from being associated with a registered public accounting firm. At all relevant times, Stone was a partner in the Austin, Texas office of PwC was an associated person of a registered public accounting firm as that term is defined in Section 2(a)(9) of the Act and PCAOB Rule 1001(p)(i). Stone retired from PwC effective June 30, 2014. This PCAOB order resulted from its findings concerning Stone's violations of PCAOB rules and auditing standards in connection with (1) the audit of the consolidated financial statements of ArthroCare Corporation ("ArthroCare" or "Company") for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2007, and (2) the consent to incorporate by reference the fiscal year 2007 audit report in a Form S-8 Registration Statement filed by ArthroCare with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission" or "SEC") in June 2008.

Item 3

Approve, on an Advisory Basis, Named Executive Officer Compensation

Recommendation:

After taking into account both the quantitative and qualitative measures outlined below, we believe that shareholders cannot support the current compensation policies put in place by the Company's directors. Furthermore, we believe that the Company's compensation policies and procedures are not effective or strongly aligned with the long-term interest of its shareholders.

Therefore, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal.

Background:

At Egan-Jones Proxy Services we review a number of factors, both qualitative and quantitative in nature, before issuing a recommendation regarding the advisory vote on executive compensation. These include total CEO compensation, company performance, and any past issues with compensation.

The sum of our quantitative look at compensation can be found in the compensation corporate governance grade we give this company. Generally and absent other negative factors, a score of *Neutral* or higher in compensation merits a positive "say-on-pay" vote. This Company has earned a grade of **Needs Attention** in compensation and thus, has failed to pass our quantitative tests.

Our qualitative review of this Company's compensation has identified one minor issue; the CEO's salary at \$1,635,417 exceeds the \$1 million dollar deductibility limit imposed by section 162m for salaries and non-qualified incentive payments. Failure to abide by IRS 162m rules results in loss of deductibility for the compensation in question and possibly increased and unnecessary tax payments. While this issue is not sufficient to trigger a negative vote alone, it does impact the Company's overall compensation score, we would recommend the board investigate and consider alternative means of compensation for the CEO and any other 162m covered NEOs who exceed this limit in the future.

This advisory vote is not binding. Although non-binding, the Compensation Committee will consider the outcome of the advisory vote when making future decisions regarding the executive compensation programs.

Item 4

Shareholder Proposal to Reduce Scope 3 Emissions

Recommendation:

We believe that setting clear-cut goals will help the Company reduce its regulatory risk related to GHG emissions, financial risk by decreasing volatility of energy prices, and overall expenditure on energy by implementing a disciplined business strategy to cut emissions from its operations. **After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.**

Background:

The shareholders are being asked to act on a proposal that requests that the Company to substantially reduce the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of their energy products (Scope 3) in the medium- and long- term future, as defined by the Company.

The policies of the energy industry are crucial to curbing climate change. Therefore, shareholders support oil and gas companies to change course; to substantially reduce emissions.

Fiduciary duty

As shareholders, the proponents understand this support to be part of the fiduciary duty to protect all assets in the global economy from devastating climate change. Climate-related risks are a source of financial risk, and therefore limiting global warming is essential to risk management and responsible stewardship of the economy.

The proponents therefore support the Company to reduce the emissions of their energy products (Scope 3). Reducing emissions from the use of energy products is essential to limiting global warming.

An increasing number of investors insist on reductions of all emissions

Shell, BP, Equinor, and Total have already adopted Scope 3 ambitions. Backing from investors that insist on reductions of all emissions continues to gain momentum; in 2020, an unprecedented number of shareholders voted for climate resolutions. It is evident that a growing group of investors across the energy sector is uniting behind visible and unambiguous support for reductions of all emissions.

Nothing in this resolution shall limit the Company's powers to set and vary their strategy or take any action which they believe in good faith would best contribute to reducing GHG emissions.

The proponents believe that the Company could lead and thrive in the energy transition. The proponents therefore encourage you to reduce emissions, inspiring society, employees, shareholders, and the energy sector, and allowing the company to meet an increasing demand for energy while reducing GHG emissions to levels consistent with curbing climate change.

Item 5

Shareholder Proposal Regarding Report on Impacts Of Net Zero 2050 Scenario

Recommendation:

We believe that transparency is important for evaluating risks and ensuring that investors and stakeholders have adequate information necessary to make informed decisions. **In accordance with Egan-Jones' Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.**

Background:

The shareholders are being asked to act on a proposal that requests that Chevron's Board of Directors issue an audited report to shareholders on whether and how a significant reduction in fossil fuel demand, envisioned in the IEA Net Zero 2050 scenario, would affect its financial position and underlying assumptions. The Board should summarize its findings to shareholders by January 31, 2022, and the report should be completed at reasonable cost and omitting proprietary information.

Proponents recommend that in issuing the report, the company take account of information on:

- Assumptions, costs, estimates, and valuations that may be materially impacted; and
- The potential for widespread adoption of net-zero goals by governments and peers.

Proponents recommend that the report be supported by reasonable assurance from an independent auditor.

Item 6

Shareholder Proposal Regarding Shift to Public Benefit Corporation

Recommendation:

We believe that approval of the proposal is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders. **We recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.**

Background:

The shareholders are being asked to act on a proposal that requests the board of directors to approve an amendment to the company's Restated Certificate of Incorporation to become a Public Benefit Corporation (PBC) pursuant to Delaware law, and to submit the proposed amendment to shareholders for the approval. Such a change would enable the company to operate in a responsible and sustainable manner that balances the stockholder's pecuniary interests, and the best interests of those materially affected by the corporation's conduct.

The Company's Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, in 2019, signed a "Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation," committing the Company to all stakeholders, including "protect[ing] the environment by embracing sustainability practices across the businesses."

Yet, inconsistent with the Company's "embrace" of sustainability, Chevron has declined to develop business goals consistent with limiting global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees and, unlike peers, has not set "net zero emissions" goals for 2050.

"Climate change poses a major risk to the stability of the U.S. financial system and to its ability to sustain the American economy" according to the United States' Commodity Futures Trading Commission. The National Bureau of Economic Research warns if greenhouse gases are not cut in line with the Paris Accord, United States' GDP could be cut 10.5 percent by 2100. The United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative and Principles for Responsible Investment reports in the paper "Universal Ownership" that over 50 percent of companies' earnings are at risk from climate costs, creating systemic risk for diversified investors.

“Universal investors”-those with highly-diversified portfolios representative of the broad economy-are exposed to growing and widespread climate costs generated by some companies, including Chevron, and ultimately incurred by other companies. The Proponent is quoted in “Universal Ownership:”

“A portfolio investor benefiting from a company externalizing costs might experience a reduction in overall returns due to these externalities adversely affecting other investments in the portfolio,

and hence overall market return. For a diversified investor, there is no place to hide from these costs: they come back into the portfolio as taxes, insurance premiums, inflated input prices and the physical cost of disasters.” (Seitchik)

It is in investors’ interest to reduce climate externalities to protect long-term returns. In contrast, Chevron appears to prioritize the Company’s financial returns over the impact of climate change on global markets.

The State of Delaware has adopted and recently amended a law allowing the Company to become a Public Benefit Corporation (PBC) by amending the Company’s Certificate of Incorporation to establish a public purpose, such as promoting a sustainable global economy, consistent with the CEO’s statement to commit the company to all stakeholders; and

In the opinion of the proponent, the approach of this law seems consistent with the CEO’s commitment to the Statement, providing the opportunity for the board to legally articulate the purpose of the corporation in a manner that would reconcile its accountability to all stakeholders.

Item 7

Shareholder Proposal Regarding Report on Lobbying

Recommendation:

This proposal, if adopted, would require the management to advise the shareholders how many corporate dollars are being spent for political purposes and to specify what political causes the management seeks to promote with those funds. It is therefore no more than a requirement that the shareholders be given a more detailed accounting of these special purpose expenditures than they now receive. These political contributions are made with dollars that belong to the shareholders as a group and they are entitled to know how they are being spent. Relying on publicly available data does not provide a complete picture of the Company’s political expenditures. As such, we believe that improved transparency and accountability only adds to a company’s long-term sustainability. **After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' SRI Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.**

Background:

The shareholders are being asked to act on a proposal that requests the preparation of a report, updated annually, disclosing:

1. Company policy and procedures governing lobbying, both direct and indirect, and grassroots lobbying communications.
2. Payments by Chevron used for (a) direct or indirect lobbying or (b) grassroots lobbying communications, in each case including the amount of the payment and the recipient.
3. Chevron’s membership in and payments to any tax-exempt organization that writes and endorses model legislation.
4. Description of management’s and the Board’s decision-making process and oversight for making payments described in sections 2 and 3 above.

For purposes of this proposal, a “grassroots lobbying communication” is a communication directed to the general public that (a) refers to specific legislation or regulation, (b) reflects a view on the legislation or regulation and (c) encourages the recipient of the communication to take action with respect to the legislation or regulation. “Indirect lobbying” is lobbying engaged in by a trade association or other organization of which Chevron is a member.

Both “direct and indirect lobbying” and “grassroots lobbying communications” include efforts at the local, state and federal levels.

The report shall be presented to the Public Policy Committee and posted on Chevron's website.

A 2011 Si2 study revealed that S&P 500 companies spent a total of \$1.1 billion on 2010 political contributions where 87% or \$973 million went to federal lobbying expenditure. However, this figure does not include corporate lobbying expenditures for state and local governments, a fact recently highlighted in "Corporate Governance of Political Expenditures: 2011 Benchmark Reports on S&P 500 Companies," by Heidi Welsh and Robin Young and the Sustainable Investments Institute's IRR Institute, November 2011.

Recognizing that companies have their own policies and mechanisms on political spending, corporate directors do have fiduciary duties that they owe to the corporation and its shareholders. The Board should check and ensure that corporate dollars spent in the political arena are aligned with the company's business strategy. The board, through its oversight function should be aware of legal, regulatory, and reputational risks inherent in political spending.

Although much disclosure is already required by federal, state, and local campaign finance and lobbying regulations, these investors and groups also demand information not required by law to be reported. Shareholders particularly the most active institutional investors such as labor pension and investment funds—support the argument that corporations have a right to lobby because it safeguards shareholders' interests. Disclosure of political contributions increases the possibility that the contributions are aligned with the company's business strategy, policies and procedures and promotes awareness of reputational risks the company faces when making the donation. Also, transparency allows investors to align their investments with their values.

Some believe that corporations should not be making political contributions in a democracy for the people and by the people while some argue that corporations should have input into policies affecting them.

Item 8

Shareholder Proposal Regarding Independent Chair

Recommendation:

We believe that there is an inherent potential conflict, in having an Inside director serve as the Chairman of the board. Consequently, we prefer that companies separate the roles of the Chairman and CEO and that the Chairman be independent to further ensure board independence and accountability. **After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote FOR this Proposal.**

Background:

The shareholders are being asked to act on a proposal that requests the Board of Directors to adopt as policy, and amend the bylaws as necessary, to require that whenever possible the Chair of the Board of Directors be an independent member of the Board. This policy would phase in for the next CEO transition.

If the Board determines that a Chair who was independent when selected is no longer independent, within a reasonable period it shall select a new Chair who satisfies the requirements of this policy. Compliance with this policy can be waived if no independent director is available and willing to serve as Chair.

Since the occurrence of the financial crisis, the clamor for independent chairman proposals has usually formulated either as a proposal to separate the roles of CEO and chair or as a proposal that the chairman be an independent director. Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns used to have a combined chairman and CEO post, a fact which has led to criticism of the dual role.

It has been a prevalent practice for large companies to have the CEO and chair positions combined. According to Spencer Stuart (http://www.corpgov.deloitte.com/binary/com.epicentric.contentmanagement.servlet.ContentDeliveryServlet/USEng/Documents/Nominating-Corporate%20Governance%20Committee/Board%20Composition%20and%20Recruitment/SpencerStuartBI%202013_04Nov2013-lowres.pdf), in 2013, 25% of S&P 500 boards have a truly independent chair, a non-executive director or a former executive director, compared with 16% five years ago – a proof that splitting the dual role has become a business trend since the mid-2000's. This reflects the views of certain shareholders that having the CEO or any top executive serve as chairman could be detrimental to the whole board's independence. The CEO's main role is to manage the company, with the board serving as a lookout to the

management. As a result, the chairman, being the one who runs the board, should be accountable to the shareholders. When the two roles are combined, there is a possibility of lack of independent oversight and minimal accountability in the board room that could put a company's long-term health and profitability and the interests of shareholders at risk.

On the contrary, many companies believe that having an independent chairman is not a one-size-fits-all approach. Opponents of the proposal argue that there is no solid evidence that link a higher shareholder return with having an independent chair. As a matter of fact, this shareholder proposal failed to win majority support at large companies. For example, Walt Disney has split the chairman/CEO roles in 2005, but in 2012, it recombined the roles. In 2013, Disney shareholders rejected a proposal to separate the roles with a 65% "against" vote. Also, JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon gained shareholder support to remain as chairman, against a proposal to split the roles after the bank has posted the "London Whale" trading loss. Also, the decision to maintain a combined Chair/CEO role or have an independent chairman should be also based on the specific circumstances of a corporation, the independence of its directors, and the leadership provided by its CEO. Moreover, proponents should take into account the current leadership structure and governance practices of a company which include but is not limited to the following:

- Having a Lead Independent Director
- Majority of the board is comprised of independent directors
- Independent directors comprise the key board committees
- Independent directors meet frequently in executive sessions that are presided over by the Lead Independent Director with no members of management present.

Item 9

Shareholder Proposal Regarding Special Meetings

Recommendation:

We do not believe it is appropriate to enable holders of below 25% of the common stock to have an unlimited ability to call special meetings for any purpose at any time. **After evaluating the details pursuant to the shareholder proposal and in accordance with the Egan-Jones' Proxy Guidelines, we recommend a vote AGAINST this Proposal.**

Background:

The shareholders are being asked to act on a proposal that requests to take the steps necessary to amend Company bylaws and appropriate governing documents to give holders of 10% of outstanding common stock the power to call a special shareholders meeting. To the fullest extent permitted by law, such bylaw text in regard to calling a special meeting shall not contain exceptions or excluding conditions that apply only to shareholders but not to management or the Board.

As a result of targeted activism in the last few years, more than half of the S&P 500 companies now allow shareholders to call special meetings (Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, 2011). Annual meetings are important matters for the investors. Annual meetings usually take place sometime in the spring, during "annual meeting season", a few months after the December 31 fiscal year-end. Investors can also schedule a special shareholder meeting, subject to some diverse and stimulating rules, and a bit of strategy.

Some companies view that such right is burdensome in terms of financial expense, time and management resources. Also, such right permits a small percentage of shareholders to call a meeting that may serve their intended purposes, rather than those of the company and the majority of shareholders.

On the contrary, many investors believe that it is imperative that shareholders are given a right to timely call special meetings. A company usually requires a mandate from investors to hold a special meeting, in which the typical threshold is 25% ownership of the Company's shares. Having an ownership threshold of 25% strikes a reasonable balance between enhancing stockholder rights and protecting against the risk that a small minority of stockholders could trigger a special meeting and the resulting financial expense and disruption to the Company's business. Furthermore, special meetings should only be called to consider extraordinary events that are of interest to a broad base of stockholders and that cannot wait until the next annual meeting.

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One or more of the proponents of a shareholder proposal at an upcoming meeting may be a client of Egan-Jones. Egan-Jones may in some circumstances afford issuers the right to review draft research analyses so that factual inaccuracies may be corrected before the report and recommendations are finalized. Control of research analyses and voting recommendations remains, at all times, with Egan-Jones.

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